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I. Introduction
The late 1990s were good for worldwide business. Stock markets were exuberant,
multinationals were selling to the far corners of the planet, and the world was more or less at
peace. But like the month of March, the 20th century ended like a lamb and the 21st started like a
lion. The 2000 American presidential election proved to be an affair more complex than simply
counting votes, September 11, 2001 became a date forever etched in my generation’s mind, and
in November 2001 the fifth-largest1 American company, Enron, went bankrupt. In lemming-like
fashion, companies around the world followed Enron in revealing scandalous corporate and
accounting policies.
Just as turn of the century events sent President George W. Bush to war with Afghanistan
and Iraq, Senator Paul Sarbanes and Congressman Michael Oxley went to war against bad
corporate practices. Their product, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), became the standardbearer for how government would regulate business. The Irish and the European2 responses to
scandals mirror SOX.
This paper reviews and comments upon how the American, Irish, and European
governments responded to this millennium’s corporate scandals. Part II reviews the roots and
effects of corporate scandals. Part III digresses slightly from the main purpose by introducing the
basics of Irish and European corporate law. This introduction is included to facilitate
understanding of Part IV, which reviews recent American and Irish corporate governance
legislation and European Union (E.U.) regulations, directives, and proposals. Part V compares
and contrasts these government responses. It concludes that the Irish legislative response was out
of proportion to Irish scandals, but that it fits into a greater mold of convergence in which the
1

Enron ranked 5 on the 2002 Fortune 500 list. See
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/fortune500/articles/0,15114,373322,00.html (Last visited Nov. 23, 2005).
2
When I use “European” or “Europeans” I am referring to the European Union (E.U.).
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U.S provides the model for corporate governance and the E.U. acts as a competent body to
facilitate convergence of diverse corporate practices.
II. Scandals
American accounting scandals are well known on both sides of the Atlantic.3 Not known
to most Americans (or even to much of the Irish and European public) are the instances of
corporate malfeasance on the eastern side of the Atlantic. This section reviews the major
corporate and accounting scandals that served as catalysts for the governmental action which is
reviewed in Part IV.
A. American Scandals
Enron & Arthur Andersen
Enron hid assets and liabilities in over 2,000 businesses, many of which where whollyowned special purpose entities (SPEs) that were not included on the Houston energy trader’s
financial statements.4 Enron booked loans as revenue and often sold that debt to its SPEs, again
recording revenue from the sale.5 In November 2001, Enron restated earnings and debt for the
years 1997-2000. It reduced earnings by $28 million for 1997, $133 million for 1998, $153
million for 1999, and $91 million for 2000. It increased debt (by returning liabilities held in SPEs
back to its own balance sheet) by $711 million for 1997, $561 million for 1998, $685 million for
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See e.g. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J.
1521, 1528 (2005); John Paul Lucci, Enron – the Bankruptcy Heard Round the World and the International Ricochet
of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 Alb. L. Rev. 211 (2003); Marianne M. Jennings, Primer on Enron: Lessons From A [sic]
Perfect Storm of Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 Ca. W. L. Rev. 163
(2003); Robert W. Hamilton, Seventh Annual Frankel Lecture Address: The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002
Style, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 1 (2003); Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on PostEnron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 911 (2003); Communication from the Commission
to the Council and the European Parliament -- Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in
the European Union -- A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final (May 2003), p.5 (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
adopted on 30 July 2002 in the wave of a series of scandals…” [emphasis added]);
4
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 8-9.
5
Id. at 9.
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1999, and $628 million for 2000.6 “Nearly a third of Enron's reported income came from
misclassification of transactions as revenues.”7 Even before Enron’s bankruptcy, its auditor,
Arthur Andersen, LLP (Andersen), classified it “as a ‘maximum risk’ client - meaning that it
adopted and used the most aggressive permissible accounting principles.”8
Andersen had a number of conflicts of interest in its Enron account: it generated more
revenue from providing consulting services ($27 million) than it did from providing auditing
services ($25 million); the “staffs of Enron and Andersen were inextricably intertwined;”9 and
Andersen was Enron’s internal and external auditor.10 Such was the conflict that Andersen was
convicted of obstruction of justice for shredding Enron-related documents.11 Andersen ceased to
be an auditor of public companies on September 1, 2002 and shut down completely soon after.12
WorldCom
Ashburn, Virginia-based telecom giant WorldCom, Inc. (WorldCom) restated earnings
downward by $3.8 billion in June 2002. It had booked expenses as capital investments, thus
turning an expenditure of cash into a capital asset.13 The company that emerged from bankruptcy
had a market capitalization of less than $1 billion from a high of $115 billion.14 It also changed
its name to MCI.
Andersen audited WorldCom.15
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Cherie J. Owen, Board Games: Germany’s Monopoly on the Two-Tier System of Corporate Governance and Why
Post-Enron United States Would Benefit From its Adoption, 22 Pa. St. Int’l L. Rev. 167, 170 (2003).
7
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 12.
8
Id. at 8.
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Jennings, supra note 4, at 213.
10
Id. at 214.
11
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 8.
12
Jonathan D. Glater, Last Task at Andersen: Turning Out the Lights, N.Y. Times, at C3, Aug. 30, 2002.
13
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 21.
14
Owen, supra note 7, at 170.
15
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 22.
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Qwest
Qwest Communications International (Qwest), the dominant local phone company in
fourteen states from Minnesota to Washington, improperly listed $1.16 billion as current profits
rather than capital investments. While making its restatement on July 28, 2002, it wrote off $20$30 billion in intangible assets.16
Andersen audited Qwest.17
Global Crossing
Global Crossing built an underwater fiber optic network that connected continents via the
internet. When traffic did not pan out as expected, Global Crossing engaged in a scheme of
“swapping” capacity with other telecommunications companies such as Qwest and recording the
transactions as earnings. The company filed for bankruptcy in January 2002.18
Andersen audited Global Crossing.19
Adelphia
In March of 2002, Adelphia Communications disclosed that it had made loans worth $2.3
billion to its controlling shareholders, the Rigas family, without recording the transactions on its
balance sheet. In June 2002, the company announced that it had $500 million less in revenue
than it had reported over the previous two years. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
listing $18.6 billion in debt. Its stock price fell to $.01.20

16

Id. at 24.
Jennings, supra note 4, at 215.
18
Jennifer S. Recine, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1535, 1540-1541 (2002).
19
Jennings, supra note 4, at 215.
20
Owen, supra note 7, at 171; Hamilton, supra note 4, at 23-25.
17
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Tyco
Tyco International lost $100 billion in market capitalization when its CEO Dennis
Kozlowski was indicted on charges of New York state sales tax evasion.21 Kozlowski used
company money as his own, spending lavishly for personal expenses and at one point receiving a
loan for $19 million which the Tyco board forgave without shareholder knowledge. The
company recorded a loss of $2.32 billion in 2002.22
ImClone and Martha Stewart
ImClone Systems (ImClone) CEO Samuel Waksal learned on December 25, 2001 that
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) planned to reject ImCone’s application for approval of
a cancer drug. One day later, Waksal, his family, and friends began selling ImClone shares. Two
days later, on December 28, 2001, ImClone publicly announced the FDA rejection and its share
price dropped from $70 to $10. Waksal and friends saved $9 million by selling ImClone shares
two days before the public announcement.23
Waksal was caught and pleaded guilty to insider trading.24 One of his friends, lifestyle
doyenne Martha Stewart, was convicted of obstruction of justice for lying to authorities about
her sale of ImClone stock. She served five months in prison.25 Within 30 minutes of her
conviction the share price of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia dropped from $17 to $10.86 and
Stewart had paper losses of $186 million.26
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Hamilton, supra note 4, at 26.
Id. at 27.
23
Id. at 28-29.
24
Id. at 29.
25
David Glovin, Judge Refuses to Cut Stewart’s Detention, Wash. Post, at E01, Apr. 12, 2005.
26
Neil Irwin, For the Stewart Brand, an Uncertain Future, Wash. Post, at A04, Mar. 8, 2004.
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B. Irish Scandals
Elan
Elan Corporation (Elan) is an Irish pharmaceutical company headquartered in New York.
Its common stock trades on the Irish Stock Exchange and its American Depository Receipts
(ADRs) trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).27 In its 2002 annual report, Elan
reduced its 2001 reported income by $73 million and its cash flow by $500 million.28 Elan’s
market capitalization fell from $20 billion in June 2001 to $600 million in July 2002.29 Plaintiffs
in a 2004 Elan securities litigation suit estimated that Elan inflated profits by $648.8 million.30
Elan engaged in an accounting practice called “roundtripping” whereby Elan provided
loans to third parties which the third parties then returned to Elan soon after. Elan recorded the
loans as capital investments and booked the return as revenue.31 Elan’s roundtripping schemes
came in four flavors: joint business ventures (JBVs), a product rationalization program, risk
sharing arrangements, and SPEs.32
Elan inflated sales income by entering into JBVs with other firms. Elan contributed
money to the JBV which the JBV then used to purchase a license from Elan for medical
technology. Elan recorded the purchase of the license as income. Elan also shifted its substantial
research and development expenses to JBVs.33
In its product rationalization program, Elan sold royalty rights to other companies. The
other companies paid for these rights with funds provided by Elan. Elan recognized income from
the sale of royalties but did not record the expense of financing the transaction. Elan also
27

In re Elan Corp. Sec. Lit., 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9913, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)[Elan].
Id. at 3.
29
Shame About the Name, Economist, Jul. 13, 2002.
30
Elan, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9913, 14.
31
Id. at 6.
32
Id. at 6-7.
33
Id. at 7-9.
28
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recognized the entire income from the sale in the year the sale took place rather than spreading
the income over the length of the royalty contract.34
In its risk sharing arrangements, Elan financed its research and development by selling
royalty rights to products under development. Elan characterized the money it received as sales
when in fact they were reimbursements for research and development costs already incurred.35
Elan sold securities in JBVs to three SPEs at great profit. The SPEs did not have cash to
buy the securities; they recorded debt for the purchases. Elan recorded profit on the sale, even
though it never received cash. In 2000 and 2001, Elan recorded gains of $40 million on the sale
of securities to SPEs. Elan guaranteed the SPE debt, but did not record the guarantees as debt on
its own balance sheet.36
In addition to roundtripping, Elan had an ingenious compensation scheme that enriched
executives to the tune of $20 million. Elan paid “royalties” to a company called Monksland.
Monksland distributed its good fortune to its shareholders, all of whom were Elan executives. As
such, Elan conveyed money to executives without disclosing the compensation to shareholders.37
Allied Irish Banks
Allied Irish Banks (AIB) is an Irish banking conglomerate with shares quoted on the Irish
and London stock exchanges and ADRs quoted on the NYSE.38 At Allfirst Bank (Allfirst), a
wholly owned subsidiary located in Maryland, a rogue currency trader named John M. Rusnak

34

Id. at 9-10. Elan’s income recognition scheme violated SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 101. See Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
36
Id. 12-13.
37
Id. at 13-14.
38
See
http://www.aib.ie/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=AIB_Investor_Relations/Miscellaneous/ir_article_printer&c=AI
B_Article&cid=1096576937320&channel=IRHP (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
35
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(Rusnak) caused Allfirst to restate earnings downward by $691 million.39 A report commissioned
by AIB found:
The fraud was carefully planned and meticulously implemented by Mr Rusnak,
extended over a lengthy period of time, and involved falsification of key bank records
and documents.
Mr Rusnak circumvented the controls that were intended to prevent any such
fraud by manipulating the weak control environment in Allfirst's treasury; notably, he
found ways of circumventing changes in control procedures throughout the period of his
fraud.
Mr Rusnak's trading activities did not receive the careful scrutiny that they
deserved; the Allfirst treasurer and his treasury funds manager - the principal persons
responsible for Mr Rusnak's supervision - failed for an extended period to monitor Mr
Rusnak's trading.
At both the AIB Group and Allfirst levels, the Asset and Liability Committees
("ALCOs"), risk managers, senior management and Allfirst internal auditors, all did not
appreciate the risks associated with Mr. Rusnak's hedge-fund style of foreign exchange
trading; even in the absence of any sign of fraudulent conduct, the mere scope of Mr
Rusnak's trading activities and the size of the positions he was taking warranted a much
closer risk-management review.
Allfirst and AIB senior management heavily relied upon the Allfirst treasurer,
given the treasurer's extensive experience with treasury functions and foreign exchange
trading in particular. In hindsight, this heavy reliance proved misplaced.
Nothing has come to attention during the course of the review that indicates that
anyone at AIB or Allfirst, outside of the Allfirst treasury group, were involved in, or had
any knowledge that, fraudulent or improper trading activity was occurring at Allfirst
before the discovery of the fraud.40
An AIB ADR-holder, Tomran, Inc. (Tomran), filed a derivative suit alleging that AIB and
Allfirst directors “were negligent and grossly negligent in their oversight of Rusnak, which
resulted in the loss to Allfirst Bank.”41 Tomran sought money damages and declaratory and
injunctive relief.42 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals dismissed the suit, holding that under

39

Tomran, Inc. v. Passano, 862 A.2d 453, 455 (Md. App. 2004)[Tomran].
AIB and Allfirst Implement Actions to Address Issues Raised by Fraudulent Trading Activities, March 14, 2002.
Available at
http://www.aib.ie/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=AIB_Investor_Relations/AIB_Press_Releas/aib_d_press_releas
es&c=AIB_Press_Releas&cid=1015597171590&channel=HP (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
41
Tomran, 862 A.2d at 456. An appeal is pending before the Maryland Court of Appeals. See Tomran, Inc. v.
Passano, 872 A.2d 46 (Md. 2005) (granting plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari).
42
Tomran, 862 A.2d at 455.
40
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Irish law a shareholder has no standing to enforce a right of the corporation via a derivative suit.
In Ireland, derivative suits are “uncommon and difficult to sustain.”43
Rusnak pleaded guilty to bank fraud and received a 7½ year prison sentence.44 He must
repay $691 million to Allfirst in $1,000/month increments. At that rate, his debt will be repaid in
57,583 years.45
C. European Scandals
Royal Ahold
Dutch food retailer Royal Ahold N.V. (Ahold) has been described as “Europe’s Enron.”46
Ahold ADRs trade on the NYSE and its common stock trades on exchanges in Amsterdam,
Brussels, Paris, and Zurich.47 “Like many American firms during the bubble years, Ahold started
to bend the accounting rules, claiming profits of acquired firms as ‘organic growth’, booking
capital gains from sale-and-leaseback deals as profit, and keeping billions in debt off its balance
sheet.”48 In February 2003, Ahold announced it was restating earnings downward by $500
million because of accounting inaccuracies at an American subsidiary, U.S. Foodservice, Inc.
(USF). Ahold’s stock price dropped more than 60%.49 Ahold had 2002 losses of $1.4 billion and
in 2003 wrote off $3.1 billion in debt related to USF.50 Two accounting practices in particular
caused most of Ahold’s problems: improperly booking income from vendor rebates and inflating
revenue from joint ventures.51 USF prematurely booked vendor rebate revenue and colluded with
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Id. at 466.
Ex-Currency Trader Sentenced to Seven and a Half Years, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2003.
45
57,583, Wash. Post, at E02, Jan. 20, 2003.
46
Europe’s Enron, Economist, Mar. 1, 2003.
47
In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Lit., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 348 (Md. 2004)[Royal Ahold].
48
Europe’s Enron, Economist, Mar. 1, 2003.
49
Royal Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 344-345.
50
Sara Kehaulani Goo, Royal Ahold Writes Off $3.1 Billion On Md. Unit, Wash. Post, at E01 Oct. 3, 2003.
51
Royal Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 344-345.
44

10

vendors to falsely inflate rebate amounts.52 In its joint venture foray, Ahold attributed the entire
revenue from five joint ventures to itself when it only should have recorded revenue
proportionate to its ownership of the ventures. Ahold restated its revenue for 2001 and 2002 by
$24.8 billion.53
Parmalat
Parmalat Finanziaria SpA (Parmalat), the Italian dairy giant, has also been described as
“Europe’s Enron.”54 The company understated debt by $10 billion and overstated assets by $16.4
billion.55 Parmalat’s problems stemmed from a need for continual cash infusions to cover losses
in certain South American ventures, to service debt, and to fund the lifestyle of CEO Calisto
Tanzi and his family. To get cash from banks, the company had to look healthy. To look healthy,
Parmalat either engaged in complex transactions with its 130 subsidiaries56 or told outright lies,
at one point booking a fictitious sale of $620 million worth of powdered milk to Cuba. In a
typical transaction, Parmalat would send a phony invoice to a subsidiary and record an accounts
receivable asset. It would then sell the subsidiary’s debt to banks in exchange for cash. When the
bank sought payment from the subsidiary, Parmalat lent the subsidiary cash, recording the
transaction as an investment in a subsidiary rather than a loan. The bank loans Parmalat obtained
meant more debt to service which required more cash infusions. 57 Parmalat issued bonds 35
times between 1995 and 2003, creating $5 billion of debt.58 “In short, Parmalat and its
confederates were operating something akin to a Ponzi scheme.”59

52

Id. at 345.
Id. at 345.
54
Peter S. Goodman, From Hometown Success to Global Scandal, Wash. Post, at A01 Jan. 10, 2004.
55
In re Parmalat Sec. Lit., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)[Parmalat].
56
Peter S. Goodman, From Hometown Success to Global Scandal, Wash. Post, at A01 Jan. 10, 2004.
57
Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 283-284.
58
Peter S. Goodman, From Hometown Success to Global Scandal, Wash. Post, at A01 Jan. 10, 2004.
59
Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 283-284.
53
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Italian law required that Parmalat change auditors in 1999. To hide its fraud from its new
auditor Deloitte & Touche, Parmalat assigned its fraudulent transactions to its Caribbean-based
subsidiary Bonlat. Bonlat continued to be audited by Parmalat’s old auditor, Grant Thornton.60
Parmalat’s scheme fell under its own weight in late 2003 when it could not pay bonds, its
stock lost half its value, trading was suspended for a few days, and the company announced that
a Bank of America account ostensibly worth $4.9 billion did not actually exist. It filed for
bankruptcy on December 24, 2003.61
III. Introduction to Irish and European Corporate Law
A description of basic Irish and European corporate law is included to facilitate
understanding of the recent changes in Irish and European corporate law.
A. Irish Corporate Law
1. Sources of Law
Irish corporate law (called company law in local parlance) has statutory roots;
corporations did not exist at either English or Irish common law. The basic statutes are contained
in 11 legislative acts starting with the Companies Act 1963. Much of the current Irish regulatory
scheme is relatively new, having its foundations in the Company Law Enforcement Act, 2001
(CLEA) and the Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Act 2003 (CAAA). The CLEA and the
CAAA are described in detail in Part IV.
2. Form and Formation
Irish corporations come in two basic forms: private companies limited by shares (where
the name of the corporation is followed with “Ltd.”) and public limited companies (noted by
“plc” following the company name). Forming a company requires registration with the

60
61

Id. at 284.
Id. at 284.
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Companies Registration Office62 and two constitutional documents: the Memorandum of
Association (Memorandum) and Articles of Association (Articles).63 The Memorandum must
contain the company name, an objects clause describing what the company has the capacity to
do, a statement of limited liability, and the initial number of shares and amount of share capital.64
The Articles are the company’s bylaws. If a newly-formed company does not register Articles,
model Articles found in an appendix to the Companies Act 1963 apply.65
3. Risk
Irish corporations have a separate legal personality and shareholder liability is limited to
the amount of subscribed share capital.66 Shares must have a par value.67 Shareholders in a
public company must pay up at least 25% of their share’s nominal value whereas shares in
private companies need not be paid up at all.68 Public companies must issue a minimum of
€38,092 in share capital.69 Upon winding up, the liability of shareholders for company debts is
limited to any amount unpaid on their shares.70
Pre-incorporation contracts entered into by subscribers are binding on the company;71
however, companies have a limited capacity to contract (think of children today or women two
centuries ago). They may only perform those acts listed in the objects clause of their
Memorandum. Consequently, objects clauses often run many pages. The doctrine of ultra vires is
still alive in Ireland, and courts may refuse to enforce contracts if they find that a company was
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See www.cro.ie. The CRO issues certificates of incorporation.
Paul Egan, Irish Corporate Procedures, 2d ed., Jordan Publishing Limited, at 19-20 (1996)[Egan].
64
Christopher Doyle, Company Secretary, Thomson Round Hall Dublin, at 4-6 (2002)[Doyle].
65
Egan, supra note 64, at 19.
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See Salomon v. A Salomon & Co Ltd (UK)(1897); PWC, Doing Business in Ireland at 13 (2004).
67
Egan, supra note 64, at 21.
68
Id. at 22.
69
PWC, Doing Business in Ireland at 15 (2004).
70
Doyle, supra note 65, at 1.
71
Egan, supra note 64, at 21.
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trying to do an act not listed in its objects clause.72 However, the doctrine of ultra vires has been
modified by statute to protect third parties who reasonably were not aware of the company’s
violation of its own objects clause.73
The courts have discretion to pierce the corporate veil if “justice…requires it.”74
4. Return on Investment
Whether to issue dividends or to retain earnings is a board decision.75 Dividends may
only be paid out of the profits of a solvent company.76 Companies may issue common, preferred,
and redeemable shares.77 Public companies can issue shares by offering them to the public
(usually with the underwriting of a merchant bank, called “issuing house”78), or offering them to
preexisting shareholders either as a stock dividend or under right of first refusal circumstances.79
Public companies may list with and trade securities on the Irish Stock Exchange.80 The stock
exchange regulations are collected in the “Yellow Book.”81 Among the more important rules
found in the Yellow Book are that at least a quarter of a company’s shares must be in the hands
of the public, a company must have been a going and solvent concern for at least three years
prior to listing, and the company must have a market capitalization of at least €1.14 million.82
It is common in Ireland for a company with un-issued share capital to issue “bonus
shares.” Bonus shares are a dividend to existing shareholders of shares representing the value of

72

See Companies (Amendment) Act 1983 §45.
See Companies Act 1963 § 8.
74
Power Supermarket v. Crumlin Investments and Dunnes Stores (Crumlin) Ltd (1981)(lifting the corporate veil on
a group structure because “the justice of the case so requires it”). See also The State (McInerney & Co Ltd) v.
Dublin County Council (1985)(“The arm which lifts the corporate veil must be that of equity”).
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Bond v. Barrow Hematite Steel Co (1902).
76
Eavan Murphy, Irish Company Law Revision, Gill & MacMillan, at 41 (1999)[Murphy]. See also Part IV of
Companies Act 1983.
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Egan, supra note 64, at 32.
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Doyle, supra note 65, at 26.
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Murphy, supra note 77, at 26.
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Egan, supra note 64, at 34.
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Id. at 28.
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the capital account. They are not simple share dividends (i.e., a 3 for 1 split where the holder of a
share worth $100 receives three shares each worth $33.33). They are a distribution of rights to
existing capital (i.e., a 1 for 3 bonus will give a shareholder owning three shares worth
$100/share one share that is also worth $100. The value of his shareholdings increases from $300
to $400). The company’s capital is not diminished. Instead, the rights to that capital are divided
amongst the current shareholders.83
Companies may issue bonds (commonly called debentures). Irish companies usually
secure their debentures with company assets – as such, they are closer to mortgages than
American-style debt offerings.84 A debenture-holder can secure his debt via either a fixed charge
or a floating charge. A fixed charge ties the security to a specific asset, whereas a floating charge
becomes a fixed charge (“crystallizes”) only if the company goes bankrupt or the parties agree to
a specific time or event.85 Fixed charges have priority over floating charges and both have
priority over shareholder interests.86
5. Corporate Control
Shareholders
Shareholders are often called members. Public companies must have a minimum of two
members.87 Private companies may have a minimum of one member and a maximum of 50
members (excluding current and former employees).88 Members must meet at least once in a
calendar year and meetings cannot be more than fifteen months apart.89
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Id. at 244.
Id. at 193.
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Murphy, supra note 77, at 47-49.
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Id. at 49.
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Id. at 31.
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Id. at 33.
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Shares in public companies are freely transferable whereas shares in private companies
may be transferred only with board approval.90
Directors and Secretaries
All companies must have at least two directors and one company secretary.91 The
secretary may be one of the two directors. The secretary need not be a natural person - often an
accounting firm acts as secretary for several companies.92 The directors and secretary are
collectively the officers of the company.93
Directors have almost unlimited powers to exercise the objects of the company.94 This
power is limited by the fiduciary nature of the position and may be further mitigated by the
Articles of Association and shareholder resolutions.95 If a director’s failure to properly oversee
the company leads to insolvency, the director may be personally liable for the debts of the
company.96
The secretary is often the chief administrative officer and thus has the agency power to
contract for the company.97 The secretary’s functions are wide-ranging but ill-defined; he is to
oversee the administration of the company and compliance with the Companies Acts. Perhaps his
most important duty is to make and file the annual return to the Registrar of Companies.98
Irish law has no mandatory requirements for board meetings.99
Each year, a third of the directors must offer to resign.100

90

Murphy, supra note 77, at 33.
Companies Act 1963 §§ 174-175
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Doyle, supra note 65, at 58.
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Companies Act 1963 § 2
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Doyle, supra note 65, at 46-47.
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Id. at 46.
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Companies Act 1990 § 204
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Murphy, supra note 77, at 67.
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Doyle, supra note 65, at 230.
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Egan, supra note 64, at 22.
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Murphy, supra note 77, at 58.
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Examiners
A court may appoint an examiner when a company is unlikely to be able to pay its debts.
Appointment of an examiner is a step to save a company before a receiver or liquidator is
appointed.101 The goal of the examiner is to give a distressed company “breathing space,” akin to
the protection provided by Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act 1978.102 The examiner
researches the affairs of the company and reports to the court whether he thinks the company can
continue as a going concern and what changes must be made to foment that goal. The court may
order that the examiner take over management from the board.103
Receiver
Debenture-holders whose debt has fallen into arrears can ask a court to appoint a
receiver. The receiver’s task is to sell the attached assets and pay off the debenture.104 The
appointment of a receiver suspends directors’ powers with regard to the charged asset.105 The
receiver is a fiduciary to the debenture holder. His duty to the company is to report a “statement
of affairs.”106 The appointment of a receiver is often a last step before bankruptcy.107
Liquidator
When a company is bankrupt and folds, a court appoints a liquidator.108 In the case of
voluntary liquidations, the company appoints its own liquidator.109 In either case, the liquidator is
a fiduciary to the company who must sell the assets, pay the debts, and distribute surplus.110
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Id. at 91.
See Doyle, supra note 65, at 259.
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Murphy, supra note 77, at 92.
104
Id. at 54.
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Id.
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Id. at 56.
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Doyle, supra note 65, at 199.
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109
Id. § 258
110
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6. Duration
Once a company is formed it has perpetual succession. The company ceases to exist
when it is wound up by its members (voluntary liquidation) or when a court orders a bankrupt
company to fold (compulsory liquidation).111 Creditors may seek voluntary liquidation, a sort of
private bankruptcy where the company deliberately agrees to fold and pay off debts.112
B. European Corporate Law
Current E.U. company law is comprised of three Regulations,113 thirteen Directives or
Proposals for Directives,114 and three Recommendations.115 While corporations must still
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incorporate in Member States, the E.U. has taken steps towards the European Company and two
of these Regulations deal with company form. In 1985, the European Economic Interest
Grouping (EEIG) became the first supranational company form in Europe.116 The EEIG allowed
a framework for independent companies to cooperate but it “gained only limited importance.”117
In 2001, the E.U. passed a Regulation creating the European Company (Societas Europaea or
SE).118 An SE is able to operate throughout Europe on the basis of one uniform legal and
administrative regulation. Creating an SE is rather difficult as the company must have a
minimum share capital of €120,000 and cannot be formed directly but must emerge from a preexisting Member State-incorporated company.119
One other E.U. Regulation affecting corporations deals with accounting standards. The
statute mandates that publicly traded companies meet International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) standards when preparing public accounts.120
E.U. company law Directives mandate corporate disclosure requirements, including
disclosure of a company’s constitutional documents; minimum capital requirements for public
companies; that Member States make laws governing mergers and divisions; the layout and
content of balance sheets and profit & loss statements; that companies with subsidiaries prepare
consolidated accounts; qualifications for auditors; rules for branches of companies operating in
other Member States; and the existence of single member private limited liability companies.121
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E.U. Commission company law Recommendations call for quality assurance systems for
statutory audits; recognition, measurement, and disclosure of environmental issues; and propose
fundamental principles for statutory auditors.122
IV. Government Response to Scandal
A. U.S. Response: SOX
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 became law on July 30, 2002.123 It changes the
oversight and responsibilities numerous corporate actors.
1. Auditor Regulation
Prior to SOX, the auditing profession was self regulated.124 That changed with the
establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).125 The PCAOB is
a nonprofit corporation126 that regulates auditors by setting audit standards and investigating
violations of SEC rules and regulations. It can sanction violators with fines of up to $15 million,
censures, removal from auditing projects, limitations on activities, and suspension.127 Its
activities are funded by mandatory fees paid by the companies it regulates.128 Accounting firms
must register with the PCAOB before issuing audit reports to the public.129
In the realm of document retention, audit firms must maintain work papers for seven
years130 or longer if the PCAOB chooses.131
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Large accounting firms (those that audit at least 100 clients) can expect an annual
PCAOB inspection, and smaller firms can expect a government audit at least every three
years.132
Auditing firms may not provide non-audit services to the public companies they audit.
“The banned services include financial information system design and implementation, appraisal
or valuation services, internal auditing services, investment banking services, legal and expert
services unrelated to the audit, brokerage services, and actuarial services.”133 The audit partner
having primary responsibility for a client’s audit must be rotated every 5 years.134
SOX applies to foreign accounting firms just as it applies to American firms.135
2. Board Regulation
Congress legislated board composition by mandating that public companies have an audit
committee which is solely responsible for choosing, paying, and receiving the work of external
auditors.136 Congress also mandated that directors who sit on the audit committee have no
consulting, advisory, or compensatory connection to the corporation or its subsidiaries.137 The
audit committee must establish procedures to receive complaints about accounting matters and
receive confidential, anonymous submissions by employees of concerns regarding accounting
practices.138 An auditor’s client is now the audit committee, not senior management.139
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3. Executive Regulation
SOX prevents corporations from making loans to executives or directors.140 Executives at
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, and Adelphia Communications were given hundreds of
millions in loans.141
A company’s CEO and CFO must sign financial statements to certify that the statements
do not contain material misstatements or omissions and “fairly present” their firm’s financial
condition.142 The signing officers certify that they are responsible for establishing and
maintaining internal controls.143 SOX provides criminal penalties for violating the certification
requirement.144 Implicit in this certification requirement is that executives implement internal
controls and that the executives monitor these controls;145 SOX makes that requirement explicit
by requiring corporations to file reports assessing the internal controls.146
If executive misconduct causes a corporation to restate its financial reports, the
malfeasant executives must forfeit bonuses, incentive-based compensation, and any profit from
the sale of stock or options made during the previous year.147
4. Attorney Regulation
Like auditors, attorneys were primarily self-regulated. Congress created a “report up,
report out” system where lawyers who find evidence of financial misconduct must report their
findings to the corporation’s CEO or chief in-house counsel.148 If the executive does not remedy
the situation, the attorney must report his findings to the audit committee or the board of
140
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directors.149 If the situation is still not remedied, the attorney should make a “noisy withdrawal”
where he publicly quits his engagement with the company.150
Congress also granted the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) power to create
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing before it.151
B. Irish Response
1. Pre-2001 Governance Provision: Section 150 Orders
Under Section 150 of the 1990 Companies Act, a court can bar misbehaving directors
from directing any company for five years.152 Section 160 is even harsher on persons convicted
of crimes in relation to companies: they are automatically barred from acting as director,
secretary, auditor, receiver, liquidator, or examiner.153
2. CLEA
In the 1990s, Irish corporations had a dismal record when it came to filing corporate
compliance returns. In 1997, for example, only 13% of the 136,000 companies that had to file
returns with the Registrar of Companies actually did so.154 The CLEA responded to this problem
(among others) by establishing a corporate “watchdog” and by providing for harsher criminal
penalties for officers of companies that failed to file their company’s return.155
Director of Corporate Enforcement
The CLEA creates the Director of Corporate Enforcement (DCE or Director), a regulator
with broad powers over Irish companies.156 The Director has the power to investigate and
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prosecute breaches of the Companies Acts,157 supervise the activity of liquidators and
receivers,158 demand to see a company’s minutes without giving a reason to see them,159 and
demand to see any other books or documents if he suspects fraud.160 The DCE is to be made
privy to the appointment of a receiver and may oversee his work.161 The Director can petition a
court for search warrants and he has the police power to search a dwelling for material
information.162 Failing to comply with a DCE document request, submitting false or misleading
documents to the DCE, or destroying documents are criminal offenses.163 The Director can
petition the court to disqualify a director from involvement in the management of a company,
and, if the court approves the petition by issuing a “Section 150 Order,” the director is
disqualified for five years.164
Board Regulation
The major duty that the CLEA imposes on directors and secretaries is the obligation to
“ensure that the requirements of the Companies Acts are complied with by the company.”165
Prior to the CLEA, officers merely had to not break the law; now they must actively comply with
its direction, or face criminal liability for failure to do so.
As far as individuals are concerned, a bankrupt person may not be a director.166 The DCE
can require a director he reasonably believes to be bankrupt to make a statement of his personal
financial position. The court has the power to freeze the assets of an officer if the court thinks
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that the officer might frustrate a civil judgment by disposing of his own or company assets.167
Application for such an order may be made by Companies, directors, shareholders, creditors,
receivers, liquidators, or the DCE.168
Auditor Regulation
The DCE can “demand” to see the qualifications of an auditor and failure to produce
them is a criminal offense.169 Accounting bodies must report evidence of a members’ breach of
the Companies Acts.170
Similar to SOX’s “report up, report out” provision,171 Irish auditors who reasonably
believe that a company or director has broken the Companies Acts must report that belief to the
DCE.172
Bankruptcy and Windups
Prior to the CLEA, Irish courts had the power to examine directors’ conduct only during
involuntary wind-ups.173 Now, courts and the DCE can supervise even voluntary wind-ups.174
The court may order inspection of a company’s books and may order a director to make a
statement to the court concerning any company property he may have in his possession or any
debts he owes to the company.175 The director may not refuse to answer for fear of incriminating
himself.176
The liquidator of a bankrupt company must apply for Section 150 Orders for the removal
of all of the company’s directors, regardless of who was actually responsible for the
167
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bankruptcy.177 If a liquidator uncovers a criminal offense during the course of his work, he must
report it both to the state criminal prosecutor and the DCE.178 The Director can demand to see
liquidators’ work regardless of the solvency of the winding-up company.179 The DCE has
oversight of liquidators and of their professional bodies.180
3. CAAA
Auditor Regulation
The CAAA established the Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority
(IAASA or Authority).181 The objects of the IAASA are to supervise how accounting bodies
monitor and regulate their members, to promote adherence to professional standards in the
accounting industry, to monitor whether companies’ accountings comply with the Companies
Acts, and to be a source of advice to the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment.182 To
carry out its objects, the Authority has the power to recognize accounting bodies;183 approve
accounting bodies’ investigatory procedures, constitutions, and bylaws;184 oversee any
investigations that accounting bodies may undertake and sanction those bodies that do not
comply with approved investigatory procedures;185 investigate and sanction breaches of
accounting standards;186 and review companies’ annual accounts.187 The Authority has the power
to review a company’s accounting if it questions whether that accounting complies with the
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Companies Acts.188 If the Authority finds accounting irregularities, it can petition the court to
force the company to revise its accounts.189
The CAAA does not bar auditors from doing non-audit work; it only requires that
companies disclose what they paid their auditor for both audit and non-audit work.190
Compliance Statements
Companies must include in their annual accounting a statement as to whether their
accounts have been prepared in accordance with “applicable accounting standards.” If their
accounting does not comply with those standards, the company must include a statement
describing material departures, the effects of any departures, and the reasons for such a
departure.191 Failure to include such a statement is a criminal offense.192 Companies must
disclose the accounting policies they followed in determining the numbers on their balance
sheets and profit & loss statements.193
Directors must prepare statements that describe their company’s internal financial
procedures for securing compliance with the Companies Acts, Irish tax law, and “any other
enactments that provide a legal framework within which the company operates and that may
materially affect the company's financial statements.”194 Directors must then acknowledge that
they are responsible for securing compliance and whether they are of the opinion that “they used
all reasonable endevours to secure the company’s compliance with its relevant obligations.”195
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Auditors must then review the directors’ statements and decide if they are “fair and
reasonable.”196
Audit Committees
Section 42 of the CAAA requires that public companies establish audit committees. The
audit committee must review the company’s accounts for compliance with applicable accounting
standards, monitor the performance and quality of the auditor’s work and independence from the
company, and report to the board of directors its choice of auditor and its recommendation on
awarding non-audit work to auditors (though the ultimate choice of auditor still lies with the
board as a whole).197 The audit committee must have at least two members, and members may
not currently or within the last three years have been employees of the company.198
C. E.U. Response
1. Action Plan
On May 21, 2003, the European Commission (Commission) issued a report entitled
“Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union”
(Action Plan).199 The Action Plan contains proposals for legislative and non-legislative action
that the E.U. plans to implement over the coming years. While the Action Plan covers many
subjects,200 this paper only reviews those germane to corporate governance. The Commission
concluded that there was no need for an E.U.-wide, super-national corporate governance code.201
It instead proposed that the E.U.’s role in improving corporate governance was to facilitate
196
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convergence and exchange of best practices.202 The Action Plan addressed ways to enhance
corporate governance disclosure, strengthen shareholders’ rights, modernize the board of
directors, and coordinate Member State corporate governance efforts.
Enhancing Corporate Governance Disclosure
The Action Plan proposed that public companies include a statement of their corporate
governance structure in their annual reports. The statement should include a list of shareholders’
rights and how to exercise them, a description of how the board and its committees operate, a list
of major shareholders and how their ownership affects voting and control rights, disclosure of
any other relationships between the company and these major shareholders, disclosure of
material transactions with other related parties, and disclosure of the existence and nature of a
risk management system.203 The Commission proposed that a Directive would best foment these
goals.204
The Action Plan further proposed that institutional investors disclose their investment
policy and their policy on exercising voting rights, and to disclose, when beneficiaries ask, how
these voting rights have been exercised in a particular case.205
Strengthening Shareholders’ Rights
The Commission proposed that companies use electronic facilities to send relevant
information to shareholders in advance of shareholder meetings.206 This would allow
shareholders to more effectively exercise their rights to ask questions, to table resolutions, and to
participate and vote in abstentia by electronic means.207 The Commission suggested that a
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Directive would best solve the “legal difficulties” involved in implementing this part of the
plan.208
Modernizing the Board of Directors
The Action Plan suggests that independent directors should make decisions where
executive directors have conflicts of interest. The proposed areas include director remuneration
and supervision of the audit.209 The Action Plan proposes that shareholders receive information
regarding individual director’s remuneration and that shareholders approve any director share or
option compensation.210 Directors should be collectively responsible for financial statements and
the annual corporate governance statement. To force that responsibility on directors, the
Commission proposed that shareholders who hold a certain percentage of shares have a special
investigation right into the affairs of the company, that directors be personally liable for failing to
adequately deal with the company’s debts, and that directors be disqualified across the E.U. for
issuing misleading company statements.211 The Commission proposed that the E.U. adopt a
Recommendation to effect these changes.212
Coordinating Member State Corporate Governance Efforts
The Commission suggested a “European Corporate Governance Forum” (Forum) to serve
as a clearinghouse for coordination and convergence of Member State governance laws.213 The
Forum came into existence on October 18, 2004.214
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2. Transparency Directive
On December 15, 2004, the E.U. adopted a Directive on minimum transparency
requirements for listed companies.215 The goal of the Directive is to improve the information
available to investors, thus helping them allocate funds on the basis of a more informed
assessment of a company. The Directive seeks to ensure that investors receive interim
management statements from companies who do not publish quarterly reports, and bi-annual
financial reports from issuers of new bonds. In addition, all securities issuers will have to provide
annual financial reports within four months of the end of the financial year. The Directive is due
to be implemented no later than January 2007.
3. Recommendations on Director’s Remuneration and the Role of Independent Directors
On October 6, 2004, the Commission adopted Recommendations on directors'
remuneration216 and on the role of independent non-executive directors on listed companies'
boards.217 The former recommends that Member States force listed companies to disclose their
policy on directors' remuneration and tell shareholders how much individual directors are
earning and in what form, and ensure shareholders are given adequate control over these matters
and over share-based remuneration schemes. The latter focuses on the role of non-executive or
supervisory directors in key areas where executive or managing directors may have conflicts of
interest. It recommends minimum standards for the qualifications, commitment, and
independence of non-executive or supervisory directors.
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4. Accounting Directives
On May 31, 2001, the E.U. adopted a Directive mandating that Member States permit or
require the use of fair value valuation methods to account for certain classes of financial
instruments in companies' annual financial statements.218 This Directive will therefore enable
European companies to prepare annual financial statements in accordance with international
developments. Companies will be required to provide additional information in the notes to the
accounts on the items that have been valued at fair value.
On June 18, 2003, the E.U. adopted a Directive to bring existing E.U. rules into line with
current best practice.219 It requires all E.U. companies listed on a regulated market to use
International Accounting Standards from 2005 onwards and allows Member States to extend this
requirement to all companies.
5. Proposal for an Auditing Directive
The E.U. responded to scandals in the U.S. and Europe with a March 2004 proposal for a
directive that would tighten audit rules in E.U. Member States.220 Inspired by SOX’s
establishment of the PCAOB, 221 the proposal calls for public oversight of auditors and
regulatory cooperation with the other states’ oversight bodies.
The proposed directive would end European auditors’ self regulation by mandating that
Member States set up regulatory bodies like the PCAOB and the IAASA. Public companies
218
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would be required to establish American-style independent audit committees responsible for
hiring, overseeing, and firing auditors. Auditors from outside the E.U. would have to register
with the Member State’s auditor regulator. The proposal does not call for a complete ban on
auditors providing non-audit services; it instead would ban the provision of these services if
doing so would compromise independence and in all cases would ban auditor involvement in
making company management decisions.
V. Analysis: Proportionality and Convergence
At least two issues come up when discussing international corporate scandals and
government responses: whether the responses are proportionate to the problem and whether
governments are coming up with similar solutions to similar problems.
A. Proportionality
Commentators often note how quickly SOX became law. Enron collapsed on November
9, 2001, and President George W. Bush signed SOX into law less than nine months later.222 By
contrast, the Irish and the Europeans took more time before passing legislation. The reason for
this disparity in time may be founded on the size of the problems.
1. American Response
America had a much bigger problem than the Irish or the Europeans. American scandals
were measured in billions, Irish only in millions. Furthermore, an American imprimatur touches
every old-world scandal: Elan is headquartered in New York, trades on the NYSE, and conducts
its activities mainly in the U.S. AIB’s troubles came from an American trader working at an
American subsidiary. It was sued by an American investor in an American court. Ahold’s
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problems were the result of misfeasance at an American subsidiary.223 Parmalat could not have
hid so much debt for so long without the complicity of Bank of America and American auditors
Grant Thornton and Deloitte & Touche. Scandals in Ireland and Europe are American scandals
too.
2. Irish Response
When Ireland passed the CAAA, it responded with more harshness to less of a problem.
The CAAA contains many provisions similar to SOX: both created auditing regulatory bodies;
both address auditors and non-audit work; both mandate audit committees; both have “report up,
report out” provisions; and both require companies and directors to certify the accuracy of
financial statements. However, there are numerous differences within the similarities: the CAAA
has more criminal penalties for the IAASA, DCE, and DPP to enforce; American auditors may
not provide non-audit services whereas Irish auditors are only barred from providing services
that lead to conflicts of interest; Irish directors, even if they are not currently employed by the
company, may not sit on the audit committee if they were employed within the last three years;
SOX allows attorneys to “report up, report out” whereas CLEA requires auditors to report
company law breaches to the DCE; Ireland requires directors, companies, and auditors to sign off
on the accuracy of financial statements whereas the U.S. only requires directors and companies
to sign compliance statements.224 Furthermore, Irish companies have to deal with the DCE
whose sole job is to enforce the Companies Acts—their criminal provisions and all. While
certain provisions of SOX may be harsher than certain provisions of CAAA, when one considers
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the full extent of the Companies Acts (i.e., Section 150 Orders), the power of the DCE, and the
fact that Ireland had less of a corporate crisis to begin with, Ireland’s attempts to prevent future
corporate malfeasance are disproportionate to the problem.
Surely Ireland had corporate problems, but they were compliance issues, not governance
issues. Ireland responded to its compliance problems: it passed the CLEA which created the
DCE to act as a watchdog. The CLEA deals more with compliance than governance – it was
passed in early 2001, before Enron and other problems came to light in late 2001. It forces
companies to answer to the government, not to stakeholders. Even so, the CLEA is harsh: the
DCE has incredible power – police power, prosecutorial power, regulatory power, banishment
power. The Director himself can make a company’s life very hard; there is not really any one
American regulator with that much power.
3. E.U. Response
This quote aptly demonstrates the need for E.U. corporate regulation:
Italy has a reputation for poor corporate governance combined with the shameless
exploitation of minority shareholders. But much the same can be said of other European
countries, including France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, where this week Adecco,
the world's largest temporary-employment agency, said it expects to delay the
announcement of its 2003 results because of "possible accounting, control and
compliance issues...in certain countries". Most European countries have mere codes of
practice for corporate governance, rather than legal statutes, and progress towards
meeting the standards of the codes has been patchy at best.225
The E.U. has taken an almost academic response to scandals, publishing studies and
proposals rather than much binding legislation. The main conclusion of the Action Plan was that
the E.U. did not need a Union-wide corporate governance code.226 The E.U. sees its role as a
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body that facilitates exchange of best practices rather than a creator or mandator of practices.227
As such, it will be for the E.U. to study the effects of SOX, CLEA, and CAAA and propose their
pearls to other European countries. It created the European Corporate Governance Forum to do
just that.
The E.U. legislation passed this millennium has mandated certain practices, but the E.U.
legislated only to foment its convergence goal. Convergence is taken up at length in Part V.B.
B. Convergence
Ideas come from the Americans, get distilled by the Europeans, and applied by states as
they see fit. Ireland saw fit to copy the audit regulator, audit committee, and have directors
personally sign off on financial statements. European states do not wholly plagiarize American
statutes, however. To use Ireland as an example, their audit regulator, audit committees, and
sign-off rules, though inspired by the Americans, have a local flare. Nonetheless, corporate
governance rules are converging and Irish and European laws passed since the turn of the
millennium show this movement.
1. World-Wide Catalyst: Enron
Enron was a catalyst around the world. The antecedent of the E.U. Action Plan was a
desire to “review further corporate governance and auditing issues in the light of the Enron
case.”228 The Economist wrote that “Europeans should stop smugly believing that corporate
malfeasance is an American vice that cannot occur in the old continent. Instead, they should fix
their corporate-governance and accounting problems with as much vigour as their American
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cousins showed after the Enron wake-up call.”229 SOX “seems to have kicked Europe's
protracted process into gear. ‘Parmalat was an extra boost, but the real motor was SarbanesOxley,’ says Neil Lerner, head of regulatory issues at KPMG, an auditing firm. ‘Europe had to
stand up and be counted.’”230
European scandals sparked European action too. “The [Ahold] scandal should dispel
claims about the supposed inherent superiority of continental Europe's two-tier boards over
Anglo-Saxon unitary boards. Ahold's supervisory board was at least as dominated by [Ahold
CEO Cees] van der Hoeven as any American board was by its chief executive.”231
2. Convergence in Regulation
As night follows day, the IAASA followed the PCAOB in taking away auditor selfregulation. If the E.U. had its way, auditors’ self-regulation would end because every Member
State would set up an auditor regulatory body of its own.232 The PCAOB and IAASA surely have
their differences: the members of the PCAOB are all independent, whereas the IAASA
membership is comprised of accounting and other financial bodies.233 But to the average auditor,
he is now governed by and paying fees to a government body that did not exist prior to the
corporate scandals.
All three governments would require foreign auditors to register with a regulatory body,
and all three seek to tighten rules about how auditors provide non-audit work.
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3. Convergence in Board Structures
Audit committees are “a new concept in Irish company law.”234 Now, the U.S. and
Ireland require them and the E.U. wants to mandate them. All three governments insist that the
committees be comprised of independent directors even though they define independence
differently. Here as elsewhere there are issues of efficacy: “[t]he parallels with America's
corporate scandals do not end with the fallibility of auditors. The lack of independence of nonexecutive directors on the board is another issue in common. Parmalat's was stuffed with family
members and local cronies. Despite a 1999 reform that imposed independent directors on listed
Italian companies, big ones such as Parmalat were allowed to opt out.”235
4. Convergence in Transparency
Irish and American public companies must disclose so much more than they used to do.
Ethics codes, internal controls, accounting policies, work papers, and “report up, report out” are
all new requirements created to make the governance of individual companies more apparent to
the public.
5. Convergence in Responsibility
Both SOX and the CAAA make directors personally liable for their company’s financial
statements by requiring that they sign them to attest to their accuracy. As in all things, there are
differences: Ireland requires directors, companies, and auditors to sign off on the accuracy of
financial statements whereas the U.S. only requires executives to sign compliance statements.
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Some have questioned whether this will hurt Ireland’s position as an attractive location for
foreign investment.236
VI. Conclusion
Convergence is necessary because Parmalat was not just an Italian problem, Ahold was
not just a Dutch concern, and Enron was not just an American crisis. “The question is whether
Europe's principles-based approach can endure.”237 The answer seems to be no: Europe is
moving to a rules-based approach where government mandates the use of certain accounting
standards and states regulate every aspect of the company.
Convergence would neither be total nor without critics. “America's rules are much more
prescriptive and numerous. For example, the American ban on accounting firms providing some
(but not all) non-audit work to audit clients, the certification of company accounts by company
bosses and the requirement that a ‘financial expert’ (painstakingly defined by the SEC) be on
each audit committee do not feature in the [E.U.] proposals.”238 Europeans have questioned the
efficacy of some American ideas: “[r]otation of auditors--one of the more controversial measures
introduced in July 2002 by the Sarbanes-Oxley act, America's response to Enron, WorldCom and
other corporate scandals--seems to have been of little use [in Italy].”239 Rotation of auditors may
have been of little use in Parmalat, but we simply cannot know how many time bombs rotation
has diffused.
On balance, the U.S. has the soft power to influence worldwide corporate governance and
the E.U. has the hard power to converge its Members’ laws. Through its legislative power to
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regulate and direct Member law, the E.U. has streamlined European corporate law and
governance. If its proposals and action plans are any indication, it plans to do more. Ireland is a
prime example of the European move towards American-style rules-based governance.
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